

AFRICA CONTEMPORARY RECORD

Annual Survey and Documents

Volume XIV

14

1981-1982

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AFRICANA PUBLISHING COMPANY: a division of Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc.

New York and London

Sudan

The Martial Arts of Survival

The one tangible and incredible achievement by President Ja'far Muhammad Numeiry during 1981/82 was the fact that he managed to survive.¹ It was not just simply the question of surviving the unraveling of the country's virtually bankrupt economy, the explosive tensions between the North and South regions and discord in the latter, the politically risky posture of an unabashedly pro-American foreign policy, and the wave of popular discontent that seemed to grip all levels of Sudanese society; Numeiry's survival was all the more remarkable in that almost all these crises were largely self-inflicted.

The adoption of the stringent austerity measures demanded by the IMF was tantamount to an act of political *hara-kiri*. Numeiry's proposal to redivide Southern Sudan into three regions, and his constitutionally questionable interventions in Southern politics had the undesirable effect of arousing Southern suspicions and of eroding his important power base there. His strident denunciations of Libya and the Soviet Union were almost an invitation to retaliation and subversion from his pro-Soviet neighbours and, at home fed a latent anti-American and anti-Egyptian backlash. In the face of the groundswell of protest to his policies, President Numeiry proceeded to effect the amazing feat of demolishing his entire regime, which he blamed for all the ills afflicting the country- and, then, rising phoenix-like from the ashes to proclaim his own political immortality.

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION-AN ASSESSMENT

Paradoxically, the process of national reconciliation which, since it began in 1977², might have contributed to the longevity of Numeiry's rule, seemed to be a major, casualty of his controversial policies. The political turmoil precipitated by these policies created a situation that was, in effect, a recipe for revolution.

The on-going feud within the ruling single party, the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), between the old cadres of the regime and some of the former opposition elements, continued to characterize the uneasy relationship between, and among, the groups engaged in national reconciliation. The points at issue were the efficiency and democratization of the political organization, the Islamicization programme, and the role of the People's National Assembly in the political process. While all parties to reconciliation agreed on the need for one political organization, they disagreed on the structure and operation of the regime's political institutions.

In an interview in February 1981, Ismail al-Haj Musa - Minister of Information and Culture at the time and a leading SSU partisan - argued that political change was not the aim of reconciliation. Rather, reconciliation was made 'in keeping with the line of the SSU policy which calls for, and concentrates on, national unity.' He conceded that the SSU might lack effectiveness and that there were opportunist elements in it who came, 'not to give but to take.' He argued, however, that the effectiveness and efficiency of the organization would come through more experience. As to Islamicization, al-Haj Musa said that society should be Islamicized before the State, and that the Islamic society should be built through 'preaching and not enforcement'.³ (B 90)

The Islamic Charter Front (ICF) leadership considered a single political organization the best system for Sudan because it tended to negate conflict and encourage participation and dialogue. According to Yasin 'Umar al-Imam, a leader of the ICF, the Muslim Brethren's participation in the political system was of an Islamic rather than a political nature. He argued that the idea of national unity still lacked the Islamic depth essential to give reconciliation, and hence national unity, its true meaning. The ICF, which had increased their number in the People's National Assembly in the 1980 elections, hoped to use their improved position to push through Islamic laws. Some of the ICF leadership complained that anti-Muslim Brethren elements and old cadres of the regime dominated the SSU and had deprived the political 'returnees'-those who had gone into exile after the 1970 coup-from an effective role in the decision-making process.⁴

Sadiq al-Mahdi, leader of the Ansar, had accepted, in principle, the idea of a one-party political system but had continued to remain outside the country, and called for more democratization of the regime's institutions. The Ansar had boycotted the 1980 elections largely because the National Assembly lacked the powers that could make it capable of handling its legislative functions.⁵ Sadiq al-Mahdi remained insistent upon the original eight-point agreement he had made with President Numeiry in 1977⁶ which, in his view, would serve to make the SSU a more effective, elective and accountable body.⁷ In a pamphlet dated 20 October 1981, al-Mahdi stated that the crises of stability and development in the Sudan could not be resolved unless five conditions were met. First, a political organization must be established with a popularly-elected and politically accountable leadership and with an organized relationship between its top and base, which would guarantee effective participation for the broad popular base.' Second, both the leadership and the popular base must be tied together through commitment to a clear ideological programme. Third, the target of economic development should be to ensure sufficiency and an equitable distribution of economic returns. Fourth, the civilian-military relationship must be stabilized through a balanced formula that guarantees

legitimacy and hegemony to the popular authority, and political participation and adequate preparation to the armed forces along non-partisan lines. Fifth, national sovereignty must be preserved and upheld to prevent internal disintegration or foreign domination.⁸

It was clear that meeting these conditions would entail the dismantlement of the Numeiry regime. It was, therefore, hardly surprising when, in an article in the London-based *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* in early February 1982, Sadiq al-Mahdi stated that the policy of national reconciliation had come to a dead-end and called for the dissolution of the regime's institutions, particularly the SSU.

Thus, almost five years' after its initiation, the process of national reconciliation which had been characterized by uncertainty and an up-and-down course seemed to have run out of steam. However, looking at developments since reconciliation began, a tentative assessment could be made not only of its positive and negative aspects but, more importantly, of what it had meant in practical terms, to the parties concerned. [As this writer pointed out elsewhere]:

The fluctuating pattern of the reconciliation process does not mean that it was an on-off arrangement. Nor does it necessarily mean that reconciliation was being cynically used as a means to cover other manoeuvres. Both President Numeiry and Sadiq al-Mahdi had reiterated their mutual convictions of each other's genuine commitment to reconciliation. There was, obviously, an element of self-interest. For Numeiry, reconciliation was important in terms of the legitimacy and security of his regime; for Sadiq al-Mahdi, the rehabilitation of the Ansar was a primary motivation in his approach to reconciliation. (B 91) But, although such self-interest considerations might have contributed to the erratic course and twists in the reconciliation process, these should not automatically be attributed to bad faith and duplicity, or to prior intentions of using reconciliation for ulterior motives. The confusion, uncertainty and vacillation in the process emanated partly from the impact of domestic and foreign issues, partly from the lack of an institutionalized framework for reconciliation, and partly from elements of secrecy that surrounded it.⁹

While the interplay of these various factors tended to complicate the politics of reconciliation, the process itself has had positive and negative aspects. On the positive side, national reconciliation had, at least in the beginning, militated in favour of a mood of relative tolerance and relaxation of repressive measures by the regime. It had encouraged dialogue between the various parties, and some efforts were made to generate genuine debate, to democratize political institutions, and to reform the SSU.

Yet, in the final analysis, these efforts either fail(!d, or failed to measure up to the expectations of Opposition groups. Indeed, if the general direction of national reconciliation were to move towards the liberalization of the political system, such

a move had proved abortive. The main reason for this could be blamed on the tendency of the regime to ignore the views of the former opposition leaders in almost all important policy issues. In foreign affairs, Numeiry's close identification with Egypt and his strident anti-Sovietism ran counter to opposition calls for lesser ties with Egypt and an even-handed approach to the Super-powers. In the economic field, the former Opposition had been critical of the policy of *infitah* (the economic 'open-door' policy), and called for a more effective and efficient public sector. In domestic politics, the regime had failed to heed Opposition plans for political and institutional reforms. Thus, "the foreign and economic policies of the Numeiry regime were too Western-oriented, even for the taste of pro-Western elements in the former Opposition. In a sense, Numeiry was 'assuming the classic role of being more royalist than the king'. Indeed, the only substantive issue on which the regime's policy appeared to be in line with the views of the former Opposition was the endorsement of the Islamicization programme. But, even there, 'the endorsement seemed to be gradually retracted as it became increasingly clear that Islamicization could become a divisive issue'.¹⁰ Numeiry had, so far, emerged as the major beneficiary of the reconciliation policy.

The President was able to contain the potential threat from former Opposition forces without making substantial political concessions or any drastic changes in the nature and structure of his regime. Internal and external opposition had been badly split, and seriously weakened, by the neutralization of the Ansar and the cooption of the ICF into the Government. It is, perhaps, an open question whether the regime could have survived the series of political and economic crises from 1978 on, had the Ansar and the ICF remained in the forefront of Opposition forces. More significant, if less tangible, is the fact that the regime gained, as a result of reconciliation, a measure of legitimacy which had been denied it in the past by a combined Opposition representing almost all the shades in the political spectrum.¹¹

This need not imply that national reconciliation had provided Numeiry with bullet-proof security, or that the longevity of his rule – to which it might have contributed - necessarily means stability. Events during 1981 and early 1982 had shown how precarious was Numeiry's hold on power. A statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the US House of Representatives concluded that Numeiry's 'popular base is less secure, for despite attempts at national reconciliation (B92), the sectarian elements, particularly Muslim Brothers on the one hand, and Leftist elements ... on the other, lurk on the sidelines waiting for the opportunity to seize power'.¹²

The second beneficiary from the reconciliation policy was the ICF, although in its case any short-term gains might be of a rather dubious nature and could turn out to be political liabilities in the long run. Some of the ICF leaders had been appointed to senior government posts notably Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, the Attorney-General.

The movement was able to reorganise after years in the political wilderness and adroitly used its new position to consolidate its influence, particularly in the People's National Assembly and in higher education institutions. The ICF had increased its membership in the National Assembly in 1981 largely because the elections were boycotted by almost all other political forces in the country. Its domination of the University of Khartoum student union did much to defuse student unrest and resentment during the critical days of rioting and disturbances in late 1981 and early 1982.

Nevertheless, the ICF leadership found itself in a painful dilemma as the onslaught on Numeiry's regime gathered momentum. In the first place, their attempt to reorient the country towards an Islamic constitution had been deftly sidestepped by the regime. This failure underlined the serious limitations to the option of trying to influence the political process from within by collaborating with the regime. Moreover:

The price of collaboration could prove costly in political terms should the Numeiry regime collapse, or should it decide, for one reason or another, to crack down on the ICF itself. In the light of recent events in Egypt, both developments remain distinct possibilities. Collaboration with the regime had also been an internally divisive issue within the ICF leadership - a situation which is ominously reminiscent of the fatal division over the same issue within the Sudan Communist Party leadership between May 1969 and July 1971.¹³

Paradoxically, Sadiq al-Mahdi's ambivalent attitude of neither collaborating with the regime, nor yet joining the Opposition forces, had averted the complete disintegration of the reconciliation policy and, at the same time, highlighted the enormous difficulties of consummating it. Sadiq's ambivalence tended to reduce his credibility as a national leader and, more seriously, it might have undermined his leadership claims among the rank-and-file of the Ansar. He had little to show for his agreeing to reconciliation; the Ansar expectation of drastic reforms had been disappointed, and their views on major policy issues had largely gone unheeded. In early 1981 there were signs that al-Mahdi was belatedly moving towards a position of repudiating the reconciliation policy. The exile Opposition, led by al-Sharif Hussain al-Hindi in alliance with the SCP and some Sudanese Ba'thist elements, had kept up their hostility towards the regime and, therefore, remained firmly outside the reconciliation process. Although the tactics of the exile Opposition were changed from a confrontational approach (to avoid direct conflict with the Sudanese Army) to a more subversive one, neither tactic has succeeded, so far, in bringing down Numeiry's regime. The sudden death of al-Sharif al-Hindi in January 1982 deprived the Opposition groups of a valuable symbol and focus of

resistance. It was ironic that al-Hindi's death occurred when Numeiry was desperately facing one of the most acute and serious crises of his rule.'

Has reconciliation ultimately failed? The question seems somewhat incongruous at a time when the ability of the Numeiry regime to survive has been called sharply into question. But any final judgment on national reconciliation must (B93) take note of the fact that it had managed to dramatize, even when it had failed to achieve, the urgent need for change. The Numeiry regime has been, so far, unable or unwilling to undertake the radical changes of attitude and approach that must essentially envisage a more open political system in which a more concerted effort could be made to solve the wider socio-economic problems facing the country. As Muhammed Bashir Hamid [this writer] noted: 'Failure to cope with these problems would most likely encourage not only support for those elements who have remained outside the reconciliation, but also the mood of spontaneous rejection which is beginning to manifest itself at all levels of Sudanese society'.¹⁴

'LIFE WITHOUT SUGAR'

That President Numeiry's regime had managed during 1981-82 to survive the staggering series of political and economic crises was, indeed, a feat no less than miraculous. The first crisis occurred in February 1981 'when more than 350 judges of both the civil and *shari'a* courts, including three members of the Court of Appeals., resigned en masse in protest against a new judiciary salary schedule. The judges resented the pay re-evaluation of 1980 which gave parity in income to other civil servants and which discontinued allowances previously paid to the judiciary.

Numeiry's reaction to the mass strike (which comprised about 80% of the Judiciary) was characterized by a high-handedness that seemed to be as self-defeating as it was unnecessary. The resignations were promptly accepted and 12 judges and advocates were detained. The Judges replied by expanding their list of demands. After a considerable mediation effort, during which the judicial process in the country was brought to a standstill, the crisis was finally resolved, with the Government acceding to most of the Judges' demands.

The Judges' strike was symptomatic of the economic and political malaise gripping the country. In March 1981, the regime began massive purges in government institutions - they were ostensibly designed to remove corrupt and inefficient elements but in fact amounted to mass dismissals of actual or potential opponents of the regime, particularly among Leftists. Some 1,000 civil servants were believed to have been dismissed. The country was rife with rumour since the Government had not given any concrete reasons for the purges, nor published the names of those dismissed. Whatever the purpose behind the purges, they succeeded only in

breeding a profound sense of insecurity within the civil service, which was hardly conducive to better performance and efficiency.

In June 1981 the 8,000-strong Sudan Railway Workers' Union (SRWU) went on strike in support of a wage rise and for reinstatement of a number of workers who had been dismissed in the general purge of the civil service. The Government declared the strike illegal on the grounds that the process of negotiation, arbitration and mediation laid down in the Industrial Relations Act of 1976 had not been exhausted. The strike, however, was successfully carried out and the country was virtually paralysed since rail is the main means of transport. Although the army was called in to keep the trains running, it did not possess sufficient technical skills to do so. The army intervention threatened to provoke clashes with picketing workers and there was a very real danger that the strike would spill over into other dissatisfied sectors.

In the face of such a grave crisis, the President took the extreme step of dissolving the SRWU, arresting most of its leaders, and declaring illegal strikes 'acts of treason punishable by death'.¹⁵ (b 94) The President announced that those strikers who did not return to work would lose their jobs and such benefits as housing. According to high-level sources, Numeiry threatened to execute the strike leaders and only backed off on the advice of the Attorney-General.¹⁶

By taking such stern measures, Numeiry was able to break the SRWU strike. As one observer noted:

The long-term casualty, however, could be the future of trade union life in Sudan. Numeiry's unease at union activity is the more acute because union demands are generally for money which the Government in its present economic condition simply does not have ... The railway workers union is the oldest, the best organised and is closely linked with the history of the country's industrial development. It also controls a vital sector of the economy. This makes it a strong force to reckon with and its demise could mean the end of independent trade union life in Sudan.¹⁷

In July 1981, a bomb exploded in the Chad embassy in Khartoum killing two people. Police investigations revealed that the bomb was not the only one brought into Sudan, and attributed the explosion to Libyan subversive activities. The incident created an atmosphere of near-hysteria about coups and a possible Libyan invasion. In September 1981, the regime began a crackdown on what were officially described as 'vagrants and elements encouraging the black market'. About 8,000 urban unemployed were reported to have been detained by the police. The authorities announced that foreign refugees found in Khartoum province would be sent to camps on border areas on the grounds that, besides putting heavy burden on food supplies, transport, health and other services, 'the refugees also

pose a security threat since some of them infiltrate arms and ammunition'.¹⁸ The Government also set up price-control courts presided over by army officers with wide powers to curb black market activities.

In retrospect, these high-handed measures - whose constitutionality was questioned by no less an 'authority than the Attorney-General himself - could be seen as a calculated precaution to empty the streets of Khartoum of potential demonstrators before embarking on a series of drastic and unpopular political and economic moves.

On 15 October Numeiry dissolved both the People's National Assembly and the Southern Regional Assembly, and ordered elections within two months to a new National Assembly reduced in size by over half. Officially, the move was attributed to the need to reduce the powers of the Assembly which would be devolved to five regional People's Assemblies besides the Southern Regional Assembly.¹⁹

Elections to the slimmed-down National Assembly of 151 members were conducted in an atmosphere of almost total indifference and apathy. It was therefore not surprising that the only active participant, the Muslim Brethren, were able to make substantial gains in an election in which their candidates ran unopposed in some constituencies, and in which the voter turnout reached an all-time low.

The assassination of President Sadat of Egypt in October increased the vulnerability of Numeiry's regime. The President's emotional reaction to the demise of his Egyptian ally was hardly calculated to enhance his own position, either at home or in the Arab world. Numeiry declared that he would carry on with the policies of President Sadat, whom he described as 'a martyr'. According to some observers, the effect of such statements was only to push Numeiry 'further out on a limb, isolating himself both from other Arab countries and from much of Sudanese public opinion'.²⁰

By November 1981, the regime had to face some hard and difficult options. The economy was bankrupt and external economic support did not seem forthcoming. The Saudis, displeased with Numeiry's tacit support of Egyptian policies, were known to have withheld their financial aid. Another source of finance was the (B95) IMF, which had made further support conditional on the removal of subsidies on basic commodities. Thus, while the regime had to work out a balance between its needs for Saudi financial support and Egyptian military backing, it had also to ponder the political risks entailed in accepting the IMF package. Numeiry was well aware of the political dangers of removing subsidies. It should be recalled

that in the Summer of 1979 serious rioting broke out in Khartoum after the removal of food subsidies had brought sharp rises in sugar and petrol prices. Numeiry had to rescind the measures, which had also been part of an economic reform programme imposed on the Government by the IMF.

The Government, in fact, had little option but to agree to the IMF terms of removing subsidies and devaluing the Sudanese pound. These drastic measures seemed, in the view of many observers, to be 'an act of desperation rather than a calculated gamble to restore the fading fortunes of the Government in Khartoum'.²¹ Numeiry must have decided to weather the inevitable political storm by 'offering his entire Cabinet as a sacrificial lamb to those who will suffer most from the subsidy cuts - the urban poor'.²² On 9 November he declared an 18-point austerity programme. In an incredible move, Numeiry blamed the deterioration in the economy on the inefficiency and bad administration of his own Government, sacked his whole Cabinet and then left the country for a visit to the U.S. What was amazing in all this was not the fact that the country was left with no Government or, at best, with a lame-duck Administration for two weeks, but that, with the exception of the Finance Minister, the new Cabinet announced on 24 November, contained all the sacked senior Ministers of the discredited cabinet.

The storm that erupted over increased commodity prices proved most difficult to contain and tested to the limit Numeiry's ability to survive. It began with student demonstrations in Khartoum province which quickly spread to other parts of the country. Cars were stoned and 120 stalls burnt down in one market south of Khartoum. The University of Khartoum was occupied by troops and tanks, and all schools and universities were closed. In many towns there was violent confrontation between demonstrators and security forces, and an undisclosed number of people lost their lives in these clashes.

By mid-January 1982, the situation was getting so critical that Numeiry had to take some drastic steps to shore up his tottering regime. On 20 January, he summoned the country's political, executive and military leadership to a meeting in which he announced the dissolution of the SSU and his decision not to retreat from the austerity programme. Numeiry offered to resign: 'If you want, I will accept a lower rank and work in the army. If you agree with me, I shall complete my term of office. If not, then good-bye'.²³ The President invited the meeting to engage in 'frank and honest' discussions of the problems facing' the country. Many, to their ultimate undoing, took him at his word. The military leadership, in particular, were critical of the political organization and leadership and resented the role assigned to the army in suppressing unrest. In a private meeting with the President, the

military leaders reiterated their complaints and demanded clarification of the army's role in the political system.²⁴

As rumours of the military defection spread, the complete disintegration of the Numeiry regime seemed to be a matter of days and speculation centred on who would step into his shoes. Then, in a surprise move that showed his uncanny political instinct for survival, Numeiry sacked his First Vice-President, Abd al-Majid Hamid Khalil, who was also Defence Minister and Chairman 'of the SSU, from all his official posts, which the President immediately assumed himself. Twenty-two senior army officers were also dismissed.

Numeiry's action was in effect a palace coup; it was widely interpreted as an attempt to pre-empt any move by the military to oust him. (B 96) To bolster his position further, the President announced the formation of a People's Committee (whose membership read like a *Who's Who* of Sudan tribal and family leaders) to look into the reorganization of the political system within the framework of the single-party organization. It turned out that the SSU had not, after all, been dissolved; the earlier dissolution referred to the leadership of the SSU and not to the Union, itself. Through such tactics, Numeiry managed to cling precariously to power. The question making the rounds in Khartoum by 'the end of February 1982 was simply: who is going to be offered at the sacrificial altar, come the next crisis?

ARMED FORCES

There is still conscription for military service. Total armed forces number 71,000, and defence expenditure in 1980 was £SI22.7m (\$245m). The Army of 68,000, including Air Defence, has two armoured brigades, nine infantry brigades, one parachute brigade, three artillery regiments and one engineer: regiment; Air Defence numbers 3,000 and has three anti-aircraft artillery regiments and one surface-to-air missile regiment with SA-2. Equipment consists of 70 T-54, 60 T-55, 17 M-47, 50 M-60A1 medium and 55 M-41, 30 Chinese type-62 light tanks; 50 Saladin armoured, 20 BTR-40 and 60 Ferret scout cars; 100 BTR-50/-152, 60 OT-64, 49 Saracen, 45 V-150 Commando, 50 AMX-10P armoured personnel carriers; 5525-pounder, 40 JOOmm guns; 20 M-101 105mm, 18 122mm, 11 155mm F-3 self-propelled howitzers; 30 120mm mortars; 30 84mm anti-tank .guns; 80 37mm, 80 40mm, 100mm anti-aircraft guns and 20 SA-2m and SA-7 surface-to-air missiles; 80 M-113 :armoured personnel carriers and eight M-163 *Vulcan* 20mm self-propelled anti-aircraft guns are on order.²⁵ [...]

THE SOUTHERN REGION

During 1981-82 Southern Sudanese politics seemed to revolve around three potentially explosive issues: the readjustment of regional boundaries between North and South; the siting of the oil refinery at Kosti instead of Bentiu; and, most of all, the proposal to redivide the South into two or three regions.

The boundary readjustment issue concerned four areas which are culturally and ethnically Southern but which had been part of the North. The first two areas – Kafia Kinji and Hufat Nahas in the north-west of Bahr El Ghazal province – were administratively part of the South until they were added to the North in June 1960 by Gen Abbud's military regime. (B 97) Since the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972 recognized the standing borders of 1956, Southerners argued that the areas' should have been automatically returned to the South. When the matter became an issue in the National Assembly, Numeiry formed a committee which recommended the return of the areas to Southern administration. The recommendation was passed by the National Assembly. The other two areas - the Abyei and Chally el Feil – are culturally and ethnically part of the Southern complex, but have been administratively part of Kordofan province. Some Southern politicians suggested that a referendum should be held in these areas for the people to decide whether they wanted to remain part of the North or to be incorporated in the South.

A more serious issue of contention between the North and South was the Central Government's decision in April 1981 to build a new refinery at Kosti and not at Bentiu, the original choice for the site and where the oil is actually lifted. Both the Central Ministry of Energy and Mining and Chevron Corporation strongly advocated the Kosti site because technical, operational and financial factors favoured it. The product of the crude oil would be needed by major industries, for example, the Hajar Assalaya and Kenana operations, which were more easily accessible from Kosti. Many Southerners insisted that the underdevelopment of the South called for the building of the refinery in Bentiu, where it would serve as a catalyst for development.

Although the Higher Executive Council (HEC) in the South reluctantly endorsed, in May 1981, Numeiry's decision to build the refinery at Kosti, the feeling of bitterness was so intense that at one point, the HEC considered the option of mass resignation.²⁶ This dramatic gesture was finally abandoned and the HEC concentrated instead on a number of development projects offered by the Central Government to ease the pain of the Kosti decision. Sudanow commented: 'Though the Kosti decision is final, its consequences in the political realm will continue. There are, however, grounds for believing that these consequences are containable and that the natural tensions between the centre and the regions can be reconciled harmoniously.'

The proposal to redivide the Southern Region opened a Pandora's box of potentially disruptive and unpredictable forces in the South, not the least because it seemed to reawaken the issue of institutionalizing political power along communal lines. The driving force behind the proposal was Joseph Lagu, former leader of the Anya-Nya rebels, and President of the Southern Regional Government from early 1978 to early 1980. Lagu's proposal envisaged the redivision of the South into three autonomous regions with borders drawn along the lines of the old provinces of Bahr EI-Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria.

In his opening address to the meeting of the SSU Central Committee in February 1981, Numeiry noted that the South had held the Sudan successfully on the path to regionalisation, and asked whether it was not time, now that devolution had become a reality in the North, to explore the possibility of devolving administration in the South itself. It is interesting to note that the idea of redividing the South is not new. Northern politicians proposed division in the 1965 Round-Table conference. When Southern politicians objected to it, the proposal was dropped.

Lagu's main argument was that, with the regionalisation of government in the North, the reasons which made it essential to keep the South in one bloc no longer existed. 'There is no more need for the South to group together because it will be misinterpreted and it will continue to ring in the ears of the people in the North that the South has some hidden objectives'. The administrative division of the South, he insisted, was not the same as dividing the Southern people; Southern Sudan as an ethnic, geographical, cultural entity would remain one and Southerners (B 98) would continue to defend their common interests. As for the Addis Ababa agreement, Lagu argued that it was not meant to be static but was the start for a better future.²⁷

Observers saw Lagu's proposal as a move to oust his rival, the South's President, Abel Alier, and, most important, to break the political hegemony of the Dinka, the South's largest tribe, from which Alier comes.²⁸ In Southern Sudan the proposal provoked a political storm of the first order. The call to 'break Dinka power,' which was implicit in the proposal, was bound to win support among the smaller tribes. But many Southerners feared that division would weaken the largely non-Muslim South in its relationship with the Muslim North. The advocates of division argued that the Southern Region was too large to be administered in Juba by one person; that division would bring prosperity to the new regions since more money would come from the Central Government; that it would provide more job opportunities; and that division would remove domination by one tribe.

The opponents of division argued that it would defeat the very concept of the Addis Ababa Agreement, bring the Constitution into disrepute and destabilize the country. One leading Southern politician observed that 'the South lacks manpower: the only surplus manpower in the region is politicians; the only appeal for this division is to create posts for politicians'.²⁹ Some Southerners suspected that the idea of division emanated not from a genuine desire to produce an efficient administration in the region, but came from the same Northern politicians who had advocated it in the past and who were now using Southern politicians in an old game. Bona Malwal, Southern Regional Minister of Industry and Mining at the time, declared that 'it is difficult to believe that this sudden call for division of the South, at a time when issues as the oil refinery are being discussed, was coincidence. There is a point in suspecting that the call for division ... is being used to detract from important issues about which the South feels strongly'.³⁰

In March 1981 the Southern Regional Assembly held an extraordinary session to discuss the question of division and on 28 March adopted a resolution rejecting the division proposal on the grounds that the Self-Government Act and relevant provisions of the Permanent Constitution of the Sudan would be adversely affected. The resolution made a provision to implement the decentralization policy stipulated in the People's Local Government Act of 1971.

When supporters of the defeated proposal immediately circulated a leaflet calling for the creation of two regions – the Greater Equatoria Region and another region to consist of the old Bahr El-Ghazal and Upper Nile provinces – it was clear that the issue of redivision would not simply disappear. According to the Addis Ababa Agreement, a referendum must be held in the South before political changes could be made. There was concern in the South that the controversy among Southern politicians over the question of division might tempt Numeiry simply to decree a division of the South into two or three regions. Such fears seemed to be substantiated when on 5 October he dissolved the Regional Assembly and dismissed the Abel Alier Administration. He appointed Maj-Gen Gismalla Abdalla Rassas, a Muslim Southerner, to head a six-month interim government that would supervise the holding of a referendum on the division issue.

The constitutionality of Numeiry's action was questioned in some Southern quarters. In the absence of political institutions in which they could express their views, the opponents of division of the South formed a 'Council for the Unity of Southern Sudan'. The Council sent a memorandum, dated 20 December 1981, to the President informing him of its formation and voicing their concern over developments in the South. 'In an issue', the memorandum said, 'where the preponderance (B 99) of Southern opinion is against (division)' Your Excellency

chose to abide by the opinion of the minority.' The memorandum called on the President not to extend the life of the interim government beyond the specified six months and declared that the Council would campaign for 'the unity of South Sudan as part of the overall unity of the Sudan.' The memorandum was signed by 21 leading Southern politicians who included Clement Mboro, Samuel Aru, Bol, Joseph Oduho, Andrew Wieu, Anglo Beda, Martin Majier, Ezbon Mundiri and Michael Wal. In early January 1982 all the 21 signatories were arrested and detained in prison in Khartoum on charges of forming an illegal party and of contacting foreign elements and organizations.³¹ In a public speech in Juba in January, Gen Rassas, as President of the interim HEC, said that any political organization other than the SSU was illegal, and accused the arrested men of undermining the peace in the South and of having close links with foreign agents. Rassas was reported as saying that the arrest of the politicians had nothing to do with their views on redivision, and that nobody would be victimized for such views.³²

Most of those arrested were released within a few days but Mboro, Oduho, Majier, Wal and Bol were kept in detention. Those released were not taken back to the South until a day after the polling for the elections to the National Assembly had closed. They were thus deprived from campaigning for candidates standing against the division proposal. Meanwhile, the question of the referendum was becoming more and more entangled in thorny constitutional and political issues. Joseph Lagu, who had originated the idea of the referendum in the first place, suggested that if the referendum was to take place at all it must be limited to the non-Dinka areas of Eastern and Western Equatoria. He stated: 'If there is need for a referendum, it must be held in that part of the region which demands to be separate and autonomous.' As to the constitutional problem of amending the 1972 Self-Government Act, Lagu said that it could be done by the new National Assembly and that the amendment would in no way affect the present powers of the regional governments.³³

These developments, amidst unconfirmed reports of spreading unrest in the South, tended to create an atmosphere of uncertainty and confusion. The proposal to divide the South administratively seemed to sow the seeds of distrust and division among Southerners and between the North and the South. The country as a whole was hardly in a position to sustain renewed strains in regional-centre, and intra-region, relations.

POPULATION

The population was estimated at 17.9m in mid-1979.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

As a result of what the regime perceived to be a threat to its security from the Libyan presence in Chad, Sudan moved away from the Arab opponents of Egypt and into a framework of a close Sudanese-Egyptian alliance, with American backing for the two countries providing the framework with a sense of power. On 21 March 1981 Egypt and Sudan officially announced the restoration of full diplomatic relations. The announcement came after unequivocal statements by Sadat that 'any attack against Sudan would be considered an attack on Egypt'.³⁴ In early April 1981, new ambassadors were sworn in at Cairo and Khartoum.

The reaction of the Arab States to this development varied from the ominous silence of Saudi Arabia to the Libyan call for an Arab summit conference to consider Sudan's decision to 'restore' diplomatic relations with Egypt.³⁵ (B 100) The Sudanese Government justified its action (which was technically a violation of the 1978 Baghdad summit resolution calling for a rupture with Egypt if Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel) on the grounds that Sudan had never broken off diplomatic relations with Egypt. The Sudanese Foreign Minister argued that the upgrading of diplomatic representation with Egypt had become essential because of the threat posed to both countries by the Libyan presence in Chad: 'Egypt and Sudan now need each other more than ever if we are to defend ourselves from the imminent danger we face'.³⁶

Numeiry claimed in an interview that Libya had become an instrument of Soviet strategy to infiltrate Africa and encircle Egypt.³⁷ In April 1981, the President announced his intention to take the initiative in reconciling Arab differences and expressed interest in aid from the US to improve air and naval facilities which, he said, could be made available in times of crisis to US and other friendly forces (presumably Egypt's).³⁸

Numeiry's belated call for reconciliation was welcomed by no Arab State except Egypt. His public offer to the Americans fed the mounting opposition at home, increased Sudan's isolation in the Arab world, and increased the risk of retaliation from pro-Soviet neighbours. In yet another move, Numeiry invited Sadat to attend the 12th anniversary of his regime in May 1981. At the end of the visit, Sadat accepted Numeiry's invitation to meet his Arab critics at a summit conference, but said that he would make no concessions on the peace treaty or the Camp David accords.

Numeiry was hardly in a position to play the role of mediator between Sadat and his Arab opponents. When Sadat visited Khartoum, Libya and Syria called upon the Arab League to take punitive measures against Sudan. In Beirut, the Sudanese,

Egyptian and American embassies suffered damage as a result of a coordinated missile attack which was seen by Lebanese police sources as 'a reaction to President Sadat's visit to Khartoum and the Sudanese call for an Arab summit conference to reintegrate Egypt within the Arab ranks'.³⁹

The silence of the so-called moderate Arab countries – Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States – over Sadat's visit was interpreted in Khartoum as 'tacit support for the Sudanese-Egyptian rapprochement'. However, some sources said that the Saudis, in particular, were displeased with Sudan's close association with Egypt and had exercised some economic pressures on Sudan.

A serious rift developed between Sudan and the PLO after Yassir Arafat had called for the expulsion of Sudan from the Arab League for restoring relations with Egypt. Sudan had expelled three PLO officials in March 1981. During the July 1981 emergency session of the Arab League Defence Council in Tunis, the Libyans made an unsuccessful bid to oust Sudan from the League. The Libyans suggested that Sudan might pass military secrets on to Egypt. On the eve of his visit to Cairo in early July, Numeiry "accused the PLO of having allied itself with Sudan's enemies. 'If the PLO leadership continues its antagonistic attitude,' he said, 'Sudan might feel forced to deal with the Palestinian people directly, instead of through the organization.' Numeiry's threat to end recognition of the PLO came at a time when he had made it clear that he was prepared to embrace American friendship in order to resist what he called Soviet encroachment."⁴⁰

Numeiry's visit to Sadat in July 1981 entailed another exercise in brinkmanship. The two leaders held talks on 'common defence strategy'. According to outside observers, 'the pivot of the strategy is not so much countering the spectre, real or imagined, of the Libyan menace, as countering "Soviet penetration" in Africa and the oil-rich Middle East countries'. As such, the strategy seemed to bode ill for the stability of the region since it tended to transcend the immediate (BIOI) military needs of both Egypt and the Sudan, and to spill over into Super-power geostrategic interests.⁴¹

The growing hostility of the two countries towards Libya and the Soviet Union had a marked effect on the political configuration in East Africa and the Arab world. The process of escalation reached a critical point in the period immediately before and after President Sadat's assassination. A few days before his death, his Vice-President Husni Mubarak was in Washington to ask, *inter alia*, for faster delivery of American arms to Sudan. 'Sadat's last joint venture with the US had been to begin intensive planning for a combined response to a Libyan attack on Sudan or other 'pro-Western' regimes in North Africa.'⁴²

Sadat's assassination on 6 October 1981 injected an element of uncertainty in the region, increased the vulnerability of Numeiry's regime, and highlighted its feelings of insecurity. Numeiry's reaction to the violent death of his closest ally seemed to underline, rather than undermine, his commitment to the Egyptian-American axis. Numeiry was one of the only two Arab League Heads of State to attend Sadat's funeral. On 19 October, he claimed that Libya was about to invade Sudan, and threatened to carry the fight into Libya itself.⁴³

Despite the unlikelihood of such an attack, the Reagan Administration reacted by accelerating the delivery of \$100m worth of military equipment to the Sudan, thereby increasing Numeiry's ability and willingness to intervene on the side of his Chadian client, Hissene Habre.

If the hardening of Sudan's attitude towards Libya was bound to have serious repercussions in Chad, so also were the growing political and military ties between Libya and the Soviet Union. Thus, the Libyan threats of subversion in Chad, and elsewhere were perceived by Washington as synonymous with Soviet threats. A testimony before the Committee on Africa of the US House of Representatives concluded:

What is at stake here is not just the future of Chad as a political entity, but the stability of the entire north-eastern region of the continent, and parts of the Middle East. While there is a rough symmetry in the mutual defence agreements concluded between Egypt and the Sudan, on the one hand; and Libya, Ethiopia and South, Yemen, on the other, the additional symmetry of their East-West connections carries serious implications from the standpoint of regional geopolitics. Given the extent of misperception on the part of both Soviet and US policy-makers, and the extent to which these are deliberately encouraged by their respective clients, is there any reason to assume that a localized fight between factions may not eventually result in a wider and far more serious confrontation across national boundaries?⁴⁴

The sharp hostility towards Libya and the Soviet Union and the staunchly pro-American posture adopted by Numeiry's regime, had obvious domestic implications. The Sudan's American-Egyptian connection appeared to critics of the regime to intrude on Sudanese perceptions of their independence. The prevalent feeling in some Sudanese quarters is that the country was becoming too dependent on the US. The view of a senior civil servant was that 'some countries are calling US puppets'.⁴⁵ Muhammad Bashir Hamid [This writer] wrote: 'Over-identification with US plans and interests could turn out to be a dubious and risky undertaking for the Sudanese regime. Excessive reliance on the American-Egyptian alliance might increase, rather than defuse, the hostility of pro-Soviet neighbours and, more seriously, it could provoke, rather than discourage, subversion from within by anti-American and anti-Egyptian elements'.⁴⁶

In late 1981, some of the tension on the Sudanese-Chadian border began to subside following the withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad. (B 102) The Sudanese Government announced its discontinuation of support to Habre's forces and its recognition of the coalition government of Goukouni Weddeye. Numeiry said in an interview that Habre would not be allowed to fight from the Sudanese side of the border, and that Sudan would try to convince him to reach a peaceful settlement with the Chadian Government.⁴⁷ In January 1982 President Weddeye made a four-day visit to Khartoum, and the two sides pledged to respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs. Sudan agreed to comply with the Chadian request to cease the media campaign against Libyan activities in Chad.⁴⁸ The Chadian President, however, was reported to have declined to accept Numeiry's plea to make peace with the Habre faction.

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (1.6 Sudanese pounds = £1; S£1.1 = \$1)

The disastrous state of the economy continued to deteriorate and, by the end of 1981, the country was virtually bankrupt. Agricultural production plummeted to new depths; the cotton yields had suffered a 50% decline since 1976 and during the 1980/81 season, for the first time in Sudan's history, cotton was not the single largest export. The cotton crop, long the mainstay of the country's primarily agricultural economy, brought in barely \$150m, largely because of poor production methods and mismanagement. Total imports climbed 25% in 1980/81 to \$1.7bn, while exports sagged 3.3% to \$500m-almost all of which was absorbed in payments to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.⁴⁹ According to foreign experts, sugar self-sufficiency – which seemed a short-term possibility at the start of 1981 with the opening of the Kenana Scheme – is not expected before the end of 1980s. Planners say the Kenana Sugar Company will be lucky if it has an export surplus before 1990. High domestic demand means the government will continue to buy all that the estate can produce.⁵⁰

The 1981 trade deficit was expected to reach \$700m and the current oil bill was estimated to be \$500m. Western economists estimated the annual inflation rate at a minimum of 50%.

THE IMF LOAN

In April 1981 the IMF approved a request by the Sudanese Government to purchase the balance available in the first credit tranche, equivalent to SDR 19.8m. The Fund also agreed to a purchase equivalent to SDR 45.7m under the compensatory financing facility because of an export shortfall experienced during 1980. IMF figures in April 1981 showed that 'Sudan's quota in the Fund is SDR

132m and its outstanding financial obligation to the Fund resulting from past operation and transactions currently total the equivalent of SDR 257.9m.'

In May 1981, the World Bank authorized the use by Sudan of an IDA credit of \$6m to employ consultants for project preparation and implementation, and for macro-economic management. But on 7 September 1981, the World Bank stopped the disbursement of all aid because the Sudanese Government had made no move to repay money owed to it. Sudan's overall foreign debt was approaching \$3bn, part of which was the \$450m (at least) that Sudan was in arrears to Western banks. According to US and British bankers, Sudan at that point found itself unable to get new and large commercial credits because of its failure to keep up adequately with debt-servicing.⁵¹ By that time, Sudan was negotiating with the IMF for an emergency loan of \$237m, which the country needed urgently to overcome balance-of-payment problems. The money was allotted under a previous understanding with the Monetary Fund but the Numeiry Government failed to comply with such IMF conditions as trimming the Budget and cutting back on imports. (B 103) As a result, the Fund held back its payments. The Fund has come under pressure from the Reagan Administration to tighten up its lending practices.⁵²

The IMF next made a payment of the emergency loan conditional on the adoption by Sudan of strict economic measures. In November 1981 the Government gave in and Numeiry announced an 18-point economic recovery programme. These included a 12.5% devaluation of the Sudanese pound; a 40% increase in taxes on oil; a 10% rise in taxes on imports; an immediate end to the subsidies for cooking oil; and a gradual phasing out of wheat and sugar subsidies. Numeiry said that these subsidies cost the Government c. \$800m a year. The parallel exchange rate was also abolished and a new rate at 90 piastres to the dollar was introduced. Reactions to the measures among Sudanese economists were negative and skeptical. As one economist put it, 'The measures came too late and consequently they are too harsh on the general public. Had the government taken serious steps to control its deficit, which it has been incurring annually for many years, the impact on the general public would have been less harsh than those resulting from the present measures.' There seemed to be general agreement on two points. First, that 'a better alternative to heavily taxing the public would have been for the government to cut drastically on its own unproductive expenditure' on defence, security, SSU and lavish celebrations'.⁵³ Second, that the regime should have taken its fair share of the blame instead of finding escape-goats for its own glaring failures.

FOREIGN DEBTS

According to the IMF, Sudan was the world's 17th poorest country in 1981 and its overall debt was \$3bn. The IMF agreement to extend further credit to Sudan smoothed the way for the rescheduling of the country's commercial bank debt. In December 1981, Sudan asked its commercial bank creditors to reschedule debt interest payments totaling c. \$80m, in the form of a three-year loan, in return for deferring new borrowing of c. \$75m until the second quarter of 1982. The \$80m consisted of interest payment falling between 1 July 1980 and 30 June 1981, which Sudan was supposed to pay currently, according to its previous agreement with its creditors who included Citibank, UBAF, Arab African Bank, Chemical Bank and Deutsche Bank.⁵⁴

On 30 December 1981, Sudan's bank creditors signed a \$500m rescheduling agreement with the Government. The agreement covered the refinancing of \$400m of capital owed to 100 banks and \$1 OOm of unpaid interest. The banks agreed that Sudan could repay the \$400m of capital over seven years, including a grace period of three years. The \$100m interest would be repaid over three years with a grace period of one year. Separate bilateral negotiations were under way with trade creditors and with Western governments whose export credit agencies had guaranteed Sudan's debts.⁵⁵

THE OIL REFINERY

With Sudan's oil needs growing by 10% p.a., the country moved towards the goal of energy self-sufficiency with a step-up in exploration during 1981. As the pace of exploration and development quickened there were optimistic expectations of self-sufficiency in oil production towards the end of the decade. The country might be able to produce at least 25,000 b/d by 1985. According to foreign experts, 'immediately extractable reserves of Sudanese crude oil are put tentatively at 60-65m barrels; but probable reserves in Chevron's Unity field alone are estimated conservatively at 230m barrels and, more boldly, at up to 400m barrels.'⁵⁶ (B104)

A measure of the confidence in oil prospects was the decision to build a new oil refinery at Kosti on the White Nile. In August 1981 a White Nile Petroleum Company was set up to find the necessary finance for refinery and pipeline construction. The company's equity breakdown was a one-third share for the Sudanese Government, one-third for Chevron, and the remainder divided between the Arab Investment Corporation and the International Finance Corporation. By the end of 1981 Chevron, with its design and management consultancy, Bechtel, was evaluating five refinery designs and examining potential sites around Kosti. The designs were thought to be for a scheme in the <\$400m-1,000m price range.⁵⁷ According to foreign experts, 'one of the problems of getting petroleum to a Kosti

based plant is the oil's viscosity. The oil could be carried to Kosti along a 550-km pipeline if it is kept moving. The heavy waxy crude leaves 60% residue which has to be disposed of.⁵⁸ Foreign sources estimated that 'a financial package is likely to include additional funding from Europe, the US, the Middle East and possibly Japan.' Funding was expected to be negotiated by March 1982.

THE 1981/82 BUDGET

In purely financial terms, perhaps the most salient features for the 1981/82 budget are the amount of money going into development investment and the sharp increase in estimated revenues. Revenue for the year was estimated at S£ 1,731m (\$2,163.8m), cf S£ 1,005m (\$1,257m) in 1980/81. Some of the increase was expected to accrue from improved tax receipts and from financial and structural reforms in the public sector designed to improve efficiency and false productivity.

Expenditure was scheduled at S£ 1,568m. (\$1,960m) up 16% compared last year's expenditure of S£1,347.5m (\$1,684.4m). The Development Budget which, at S£529m (\$66J.3m), was nearly 28% up on 1980/81, would concentrate on infrastructural improvement and the rehabilitation of the irrigated agriculture sector. The Local Government Budget went up by 20.3% on 1980/81 at S£ 368m (\$460m). Some observers considered the increase surprisingly small-despite Sudan's chronic financial difficulties-given the recent decentralization moves which created six semi-autonomous regions in northern Sudan.

(The World Bank is coordinating a major long-term programme to rescue agriculture, with particular emphasis on increasing cotton yields. The sugar, textile and cement industries, which are producing well below capacity, will also receive help).

The 1981/82 Budget represented a major effort to bail the ailing economy from its downwards plunge. The marked switch of resources into infrastructural and development investment are best understood in the light of the very inadequate levels of both industrial and agricultural productivity in the national economy, particularly in the public sector. Although the Budget was passed by the People's National Assembly without difficulty, it was widely feared that the Budget and the envisaged reforms could drastically increase prices and inflation.

NOTES

1. For previous surveys of Sudan see the 13 earlier volumes of *Africa Contemporary Record*
2. See *ACR* 1977-78, 1978-79, 1979-80, 1980-81.
3. *Sudanow*, Khartoum, February 1981.
4. *Ibid.*
5. See *ACR* 1980-81, p. B98.
6. See *ACR* 1977-78, p. B118.
7. *Sudanow*, February 1981.
8. "al-Sudan: Ila Ayn?" (The Sudan: Where to?), Khartoum, 20 October 1981.
9. Muhammad Bashir Hamid, 'The Politics of Reconciliation: The Numeiry Regime and the National Front Opposition', DSRC Seminar Series, Discussion Paper No.4, Khartoum, January 1982.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Ibid.*
12. *Statement presented to the Subcommittee on Africa, Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, Washington D.C. 29 October 1981*
13. 13. M.B. Hamid, *op. cit.*
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Sudan News Agency (SUNA)*, 17 June 1981.
16. *Newsweek*, Atlantic Edition, London, 21 September 1981.
17. *The Middle East*, London, August 1981.
18. *Al-Ayam*, 13 September 1981.
19. *al-Sahafa*, 5 October 1981.
20. *The Times*, London, 10 October 1981.
21. *The Guardian*, London, 11 November 1981.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *SUNA*, 20 January 1982.
24. *Al-Mustaqbal*, Paris, 13 February 1982.

25. International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* 1981-82, London, 1981.
26. *Sudanow*, June 1981.
27. *Ibid.*
28. *The Economist*, London, 9 January 1982.
29. Angelo Beda, Speaker of the Southern Regional Assembly at the time, cited in *Sudanow*, April 1981.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *al-Sahafa*, 7 January 1982.
32. *Sudanow*, February 1982.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Middle East Intelligence Survey*, London, 16/31 March 1981
35. *Akhbar al-Yom*, Cairo, 21 March 1981
36. *Sudanow*, April 1981.
37. *Al-Hawadess*, London, March 1981
38. *International Herald Tribune*, Paris, April 1981
39. *Sudanow*, June 1981.
40. *The Guardian*, Manchester, 27 July 1981.
41. *New African*, London, July 1981.
42. *Newsweek*, Washington, 19 October 1981.
43. *Al-Ayam*, 20 October 1981.
44. Testimony presented to the Subcommittee on Africa, Committee of Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, Washington D.C. 29 October 1981.
45. *Newsweek*, 21 September 1981
46. Muhammad B. Hamid, 'Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy: "Splendid Isolation", Radicalization, and "Finlandisation"' Paper presented to *the Fourth International Conference on the Nile Valley: 'Continuity and Change.'* Institute of African and Asian Studies, University of Khartoum, 24-28 November 1981
47. *Sudanow*, January 1982.
48. *Ibid*, February 1982.

49. *International Herald Tribune*, Paris, 30 November 1981.
50. *Middle East Economic Digest* (MEED), London, 9 October 1981.
51. *International Herald Tribune*, Paris, 30 November 1981.
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Sudanow*, December 1981.
54. *The Financial Times*, London, 8 December 1981.
55. *The Guardian*, 31 December 1981.
56. *8 days*, London, 12 November 1981.
57. *MEED*, 9 October 1981.
58. *AED*, London, 12 June 1981.